The NATO SCR role for coordination never transpired; It was tried, but did not work; There was no coordination between PRTs and the SCR except for occasional teleconference or visit; No donor wants to be coordinated; SCR had no visibility and only became prominent when Cetin was the SCR, after which Mark Sidwell expanded the office;

CERP was out of control until 2010; It constructed unused buildings; SCR followed ISAF who followed CERP; Respected local elders were not eager to associate with military;

The District Development Program unified and harnessed CERP somewhat as it had to go through a DDP ostensibly tied to National Development Framework; USAID says DDPs failure because of engagement of IDLG; SCR followed USAID in engaging with IDLG;

In 2009/2010 governors were replaced and budgets reconfigured; Budgets should have focused on the center, but the philosophy was to align aid at the technical level; It was detached from the central system and was not incorporated by MoF into budget; There was no tie to MoF because MoF did not recognize IDLG; All sub-national structures were parallel and only good until funding is done; Districts sometimes abandoned; Development had no effect on solving insurgency as a consequence;

Current approach taken by mission Resolute Support in relation to MOI and MOD should be applied to all ministries; RS is doing good for MOI/DOD, they are the most functional; Others will be left behind;