**Project Title and Code:** SIGAR LL-02: Lessons Learned from Aid Coordination in Afghanistan  
**Date:** January 29, 2015  
**Interviewees:** [Redacted]  
**SIGAR Attendees:** Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert / Consultant  
**Location:** Kabul, Afghanistan  

**Purpose:** To receive perspective on coordination during his time in Afghanistan

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**Summary of Key Discussion:**

- USAID always speaks with others; The country strategy always asks how it relates to Afghan development goals; People in AID would try to implement Paris Principles before they were articulated in Paris; Legislation and policy help a lot for coordination; It creates alignment and provides structures;  
- Khalilzad was Ambassador for US; Close to Karzai; Contact leads to coordination; More difficult to coordinate when on lock-down at the Embassy;  
- In the early day no one believed in AID; DOD did not believe AID knew what to do; Afghan Reconstruction Group was established with powerful private sector executives without experience in development; In the area of schools, AID wanted to take time to see what was needed, but DOD built 500 right away; Much more interest in get it done; Politicians wanted to push;  
- Easier to get synergy now; AID program aligns with the Afghan President’s plan; Where it does not align they need to step back and look at it; Call program people and see why it is an outlier;  
- AID has good relations with other donors; Frequent donor meetings; Lots of interaction with Afghans; Donor sector now good and budding relationship with DABS; Lots of meetings with DABS; More communication;  
- PRT delivered aid can be a good idea in theory because it allows government to get to the locals;

**Follow-up:**

- None