**Project Title and Code:** SIGAR LL-02: Lessons Learned from Aid Coordination in Afghanistan  
**Date:** January 29, 2015  
**Interviewees:** Grant McLeod, Subject Matter Expert / Consultant and Diane Dean-Negron  
**Location:** Kabul, Afghanistan  
**Purpose:**

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**Summary of Key Discussion:**

- Worked a lot on ANDS; Coordinated for AID and Embassy; Long process; Contentious; Donors did not agree with each other; Afghans didn’t always like comments; ANDS was too much of everything; Expectations too high; Unmanageable ambitions; International community brought in a lot of consultants because it needed to be done quickly;  
- Realizing Self Reliance was more focused; Economic driven; The Government consulted with donors; Donors made extensive comments coordinated through UNAMA; Priorities are influenced by donors; TMAF always assumed refresh; Don’t know what it will look like;  
- USG took time to align with government because did not feel government was clean enough; Lack of trust; Need something back; Afghanistan was blaming donors for everything; Government has been able to take leadership now; Initiated a portfolio review; US will realign where they don’t currently; Funding levels are not yet known; Less money means that alignment is more important;  
- In the early days donor coordination was basically Italians do law, Brits do CN; Some programs were politically divided; US did not have a consistent strategy; Bush was starting to get it by the end of his term, then the Obama administration came in with new ideas; NSC with Bush was collaborative; very directed, but cohesive; Coordination was more than sufficient; AIOG met all the time; NSC directors are civil service; Knew their stuff; Military always has rosy picture; Everything US did fit into it;  

**Follow-up:**  
- None.